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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in the same manner that mental capacity determines responsibility in
the area of negligence.
The Court in the instant case did not consider the defendant's
capacity to know wrongfulness, and merely stated that liability for
battery was predicated on intent to establish the contact.3 1 It was
asserted that the defendant's age was relevant only to determine what
he was capable of knowing in reference to the certainty of the contact,
and from that knowledge the necessary intent could be inferred.
It is submitted that the ultimate basis of tort liability is wrong-
fulness.32 However, since the law must operate with externals as
its guide, knowledge of wrongfulness has been translated into the
objective, average man concept.-m Consequently, where the act is
found to have been done intentionally, the law presumes the moral
factor and imposes liability.3 4  It is indisputable that this judicial
technique is just, where the defendant has capacity for wrongfulness.
But where the defendant is incapable of knowing wrong, moral re-
sponsibility is no longer a possibility; it therefore cannot be presumed.
Only a fiction can attribute moral significance to the physical act.
The Court in the instant case should have required a finding as to
whether or not infants of the defendant's age would have known the
act was wrongful. The effect of failing to make such a finding is to
impose absolute liability on infants in an area of the law where such
should not be the rule.
A
TORTS- DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY- MISSTATEMENT OF
PRICE NOT AcTIONABLE.-Plaintiff marketed a toy airplane which
sold for $3.00. The defendant, in a fictional motion picture, depicted
the toy as selling for $.65. Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that such
representation constituted disparagement of property. The Appellate
Division held, per curiam, that a cause of action was not stated in the
absence of allegations showing how the misstatement of price accom-
plished disparagement of quality. Marxman Pipes, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 285 App. Div. 135, 135 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1st Dep't
1954).
Disparagement of property is a form of interference with eco-
nomic relations. The earliest cases, arising shortly before 1600, in-
volved oral aspersions cast upon the ownership of realty, thereby
31 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 16, comment a (1929).
32 See Radin, Speculative Inquiry Into The Nature Of Torts, 21 TEXAS L.
REv. 697 (1943).
33 See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 161-63 (1881).3 4 Id. at 108.
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preventing its sale or lease.' In the nineteenth century the action was
enlarged to include written aspersions concerning land 2 and also the
title to personal property. 3  Disparagement of the quality of per-
sonalty,4 and the protection of trademarks,5 patent rights 6 and copy-
rights 7 have come within the purview of this action.
It is well established that an action will lie where falsehoods, not
actionable per se, are maliciously published and produce actual dam-
age.8 The plaintiff must prove a false statement, malice, and special
damages in order to recover. 9 All jurisdictions agree on the essential
elements of the action 10 but disagree as to their nature. Some courts
require actual malice,'1 while in others legal malice will suffice.12
Special damages, the gist of the action,13 must flow proximately from
the false statement.14 Usually, only the loss of specific sales can be
recovered 15 and a general decline in business is not remediable. 16
1 See Pennyman v. Rabanks, Cro. Eliz. 427, 78 Eng. Rep. 668 (Q.B. 1595);
Gerrard v. Dickenson, Cro. Eliz. 196, 78 Eng. Rep. 452 (Q.B. 1590).2 See Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N.C. 371, 132 Eng. Rep. 453 (Q.B. 1836).
3 See Like v. McKinstry, 41 Barb. 186 (Sup. Ct. 1863), aff'd, 3 Abb. App.
Dec. 62 (N.Y. 1868).
4 See Snow v. Judson, 38 Barb. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862) ; Western Counties
Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L.R. 9 Ex. 218 (1874).
5 See Baeder v. Baeder, 52 Hun 170 (N.Y. Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1889).
6 See Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 57 N.Y. 119 (1874); Snow v.
Judson, supra note 4; Hanson v. Hall Mfg. Co., 194 Iowa 1213, 190 N.W. 967
(1922).
7 See John W. Lovell Co. v. Houghton, 116 N.Y. 520, 22 N.E. 1066 (1889).
s See Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q.B. 524 (C.A.) ; Al Raschid v. News
Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934); British Ry. Traffic & Electric
Co. v. C.R.C. Co., (1922] 2 K.B. 260 (1921).
9 Womack v. McDonald, 219 Ala. 75, 121 So. 57 (1929) ; Gudger v. Manton,
21 Cal.2d 537, 134 P.2d 217 (1943) ; Cawrse v. Signal Oil Co., 164 Ore. 666,
103 P.2d 729 (1940).
10 See, e.g., Herzog v. Kronman, 82 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; International
Visible Systems Corp. v. Remington-Rand, Inc., 65 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1933);
Cronkhite v. Chaplin, 282 Fed. 579 (8th Cir. 1922) ; Gudger v. Manton, supra
note 9.
11 See, e.g., Walley v. Hunt, 212 Miss. 294, 54 So.2d 393 (1951); Wheelock
v. Batte, 225 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
12 See, e.g., Lehman v. Goldin, 160 Fla. 710, 36 So.2d 259 (1948); cf. Dalzell
v. Dean Hotel Co., 193 Mo. App. 379, 186 S.W. 41 (1916); see Smith,
Disparagement of Property II, 13 CoLum. L. REv. 121, 137-39 (1913).
13 See Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. N.Y.
1937); Kendall v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 14 (1851).
14 Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532, 27 Pac. 527 (1891) ; Wilson v. Dubois,
35 Minn. 471, 29 N.W. 68 (1886).
15 Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d
255 (8th Cir. 1926) ; Stevenson v. Love, 106 Fed. 466, 468 (C.C.D. N.J. 1901)
(dictum); Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537, 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) (dictum).
26 Tower v. Crosby, 214 App. Div. 392, 212 N.Y. Supp. 219 (4th Dep't 1925) ;
Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W.
231 (1932) ; see Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 198 (1936).
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The statement is defamatory if it tends to prejudice the plaintiff's
product in the eyes of a substantial minority.17 Generally, the falsity
may pertain to anything that is capable of influencing the decision of
a customer.' 8 The Restatement imposes liability for any publication
of a false statement under such circumstances as would lead a reason-
able man to foresee that a sale of property would thereby be pre-
vented.' 9 This rule does not limit recovery to words directly attack-
ing quality. In England the action has not failed because the words
remotely affected quality. Thus in Malachy v. Soper,20 false state-
ments caused the plaintiff's mining shares to become much depreciated
and lessened in value.2 1 In Canada,22 a publication that a house was
haunted was held sufficient to support an action by the owner to re-
cover damages for the depreciation in value of the property. In this
country a Pennsylvania court, allowing recovery, acknowledged cer-
tain misrepresentations to be ". . a most successful mode of depre-
ciating the value of the land. .... ,, 23 In these cases, the fact that
the misrepresentations affected only value was in no way controlling
in the courts' final determination.
In New York there seems to be a tendency to more loosely con-
strue the action for disparagement of product. In Al Raschid v. News
Syndicate Co.,24 the plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution. The
defendant had uttered false statements which resulted in the institu-
tion of deportation proceedings against the plaintiff. No recovery
was allowed because the plaintiff failed to make out a cause of action.
The court, however, considered the doctrine expressed in Ratcliffe v.
Evans,2 '5 a leading case in the development of disparagement actions,
as offering a possible remedy for the wrong committed. 26 Similarly,
in Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co.,27 the plaintiff
alleged that he was injured by the defendants' intentional failure to
include his songs in a rendition of the ten most popular tunes of the
week. The plaintiff failed to recover because of his inability to prove
17 See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); 2 CALLMANN, UNFArR
COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 43.2d (2d ed. 1950).is See 2 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 43.2b.
19 Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229, 231 (10th Cir. 1939)
(dictum) ; see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 626, 629, comment f (1938).
20 3 Bing. N.C. 371, 132 Eng. Rep. 453 (C.P. 1836).
21 Id. at 377, 132 Eng. Rep. at 456.
22 See Manitoba Free Press Co. v. Nagy, 39 Can. Sup. Ct. 340 (1907).
23 Paull v. Halferty, 63 Pa. 46, 50 (1869).
24 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934).
25 [1892] 2 Q.B. 524 (C.A.). "That an action will lie for written or oral
falsehoods, not actionable per se nor even defamatory, where they are mali-
ciously published, where they are calculated in the ordinary course of things
to produce, and where they do produce, actual damage, is established law."
Id. at 527.
26 See Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., supra note 24 at 4, 191 N.E. at
714; 14 B.U.L. REv. 856 (1934).
27268 App. Div. 707, 53 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't 1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
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special damages. Had the opposite been true, there is little doubt
that he would have recovered on the theory of disparagement. 28 The
significance of the latter case lies in the fact that it was the omission
of a statement, rather than a publication, that caused the injury.
The instant case denies a cause of action on the basis of the
nature of the false statement. In concluding that misrepresentations
solely of value will not support a disparagement action, the Court
seems to have departed from the more liberal construction placed on
the action in the Al Raschid and Advance Music cases. This deter-
mination, coupled with the difficulty of proving special damages,
greatly limits the availability of the remedy. Since equity will not
enjoin such defamations, 29 the adequacy of judicial protection becomes
highly questionable.3 0 The common-law system of writs could not
have more efficiently produced a damnum absque injuria.
The action for disparagement of product is concerned with the
effect of a false statement upon the public estimation of a product.
In an age when the buying habits of the public are controlled by
labels, and the price they reflect, rather than by the inherent quality
of goods, it seems unrealistic to indulge in refinements such as found
in the instant case. It is submitted that if a misrepresentation tends
to lessen the estimation of a good in the eyes of a reasonable man,
recovery should be allowed. The injurious effect of the statement,
rather than its nature, should be controlling.
28 See 45 CoLum. L. REv. 473 (1945) ; 14 FORDHAm L. REv. 114 (1945).
29 See Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
30 See Note, Equity and the Disparagement of Business, 24 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 269 (1950).
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